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This paper discusses the bankruptcy and restructuring that Premier Parks (“Six Flags”) 
recently underwent in order to return the company to profitability.  The discussion begins with a 
summary of the company’s history and an introduction to the key players in the restructuring 
process, including the relevant circumstances and management figures responsible for the 
considerable financial problems that brought Six Flags to make a Chapter 11 filing.  
Contextually significant factors such as economic and industry conditions, stakeholder 
motivations, and media occurrences that were particularly relevant are examined as well.  The 
paper provides an account of the bankruptcy proceedings from the company’s pre-petition plan 
to the court’s confirmation of the debtor’s re-organization strategy.  The company’s subsequent 
negotiations with its lenders and creditors along with the proposed alternative methods to 
resolve Six Flags’ financial issues are also detailed.  The paper concludes with a discussion of 
Six Flags’ economic position post-bankruptcy, and the company’s most current market share 
and forecast for the upcoming 2014 season.  
I. A HISTORY OF THE COMPANY
A. History of Six Flags
You could say that Six Flags was an accidental success.  The company was founded in 
1961 by Angus G. Wynne, Jr., a Texas real estate developer who intended it to be no more than a 
temporary attraction to increase funds for other projects in Arlington.1  When attendance
significantly exceeded expectations, it became apparent that the park would be a permanent 
fixture.2  The park had 8,374 visitors during its grand opening on August 1, 1961, and through
the next ten years hosted 17.5 million visitors.3  The park’s founder was the son of a prominent
attorney who was the first president of the state bar of Texas.4  Wynne did not follow in his
father’s footsteps, and instead served in the Navy during World War II, eventually developing a 
1 History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/ 
(last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
2 Id.
3 Six Flags Over Texas, CAREERBUILDER, http://www.careerbuilder.com/Jobs/Company/ 
C8G54Q6FSBSNPSYQM3M/Six-Flags-Over-Texas/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014); Texans 
Head for the Thrills at Six Flags, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/
texans-head-for-the-thrills-at-six-flags (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
4 Joan Jenkins Perez, Wynne, Angus Gilchrist, Sr., HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://
www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fwy03 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014)
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successful career in real estate.5  Most notably, he was the founder and developer of Wynnewood
Village Shopping Center and Wynnewood neighborhood, both still in existence and located in 
Dallas.6
Wynne had modeled Six Flags Over Texas after Disneyland which had opened in 
California a few years before.  However, he tweaked the business model slightly in several ways, 
most notably by charging a single admission price as opposed to using the pay-as-you-go pricing 
scheme that Disneyland and other similar attractions used at the time.7  This new pricing model
proved to be immensely successful and enhanced the overall popularity of the park, especially 
for families who wanted to know at the outset how much they would be spending for a day at the 
park.  Wynne’s wife, Joanne, is credited with the park’s name when after hearing Wynne’s 
original plan to call it “Texas Under Six Flags” she remarked that “Texas wasn’t under 
anything.”8  Thus, Six Flags Over Texas was born, and through several ownership changes along
with significant expansion and acquisitions has multiple locations within North America.   
A discussion of Six Flags is not complete without mentioning the industry behemoth that 
started it all, the Disney theme parks.  Despite being often and incorrectly credited as America’s 
“first” theme park, Disneyland maintains the distinction of being the first theme park to 
experience massive commercial success.9  Amusement parks in Coney Island and Atlantic City
had previously become considerably popular, and although not technically “theme” parks in the 
5 Id.
6 Michelle Stanard, Wynnewood North, PRESERVATION DALLAS, http://
www.preservationdallas.org/neighborhood-resources/discover-dallas/wynnewood-north/ (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
7 History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/ (last 
accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
8 Id.
9 Amusement & Theme Parks, GOODMAGIC.COM, http://www.goodmagic.com/websales/midway/
amuse.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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sense of being built around a particular story or “theme,” these parks shared many similarities to 
Disneyland.10  One of the biggest differences that Disneyland offered when it opened in 1955
was a particularly clean and family-friendly atmosphere.11  The massive success that Walt
Disney had achieved in the Disneyland theme park was a result of years of planning.  Disney had 
first conceived of the idea after visiting several amusement parks with his daughters in the 1930s 
and 1940s.  Amusement parks of the era were typically crude and dirty and often rife with adult 
themes and otherwise inappropriate atmospheres for children.12  Disney envisioned a “little
family park” that both adults and children could enjoy for a day.13  When Disneyland opened in
Anaheim, California, it was massively publicized and hosted by Art Linkletter, Bob Cummings, 
and then television personality, Ronald Reagan.14  The park quickly became an enormous
commercial success. In a short time, the park achieved a tenfold return on its original investment 
and was hosting guests from all over the world.15
Although Six Flags was clearly an attempt to replicate the theme park template that 
Disneyland had become, it had a few key differences.  Unlike Disneyland, which targets local 
and out of state customers and is labeled as a “destination theme park,” Six Flags Over Texas 
was specifically tailored to draw primarily local consumers.16  Because the park’s target market
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Brian Bennett, A Brief History of the Disney Parks, MOUSE PLANET, http://
www.mouseplanet.com /dtp/archive/other/history.htm (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
13 Id.
14 The Grand Opening of Disneyland, DESIGNING DISNEY, http://www.designingdisney.com/
content/grand-opening-disneyland (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
15 About Walt Disney, Walt Disney Archives, https://d23.com/walt-disney-archives/about-
waltdisney/ (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
16 Six Flags Timeline, SACRAMENTO STATE, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/s/shawg/articles/
facilities/six_flags_timeline.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014) (discussing Angus Wynne 
“perhaps because he was clever or perhaps because he was
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was significantly smaller, there was a significant difference in cost between the two parks as 
well.  Disneyland cost nearly five times the amount of Six Flags at over $17 million, whereas Six 
Flags Over Texas opened to the public at a cost of around $3 million.17  Furthermore, unlike
Disneyland’s year round operations, Six Flags operates seasonally and is considered a “regional 
theme park” that uses its off season during the winter to add new attractions each year.18  Pricing
between the two parks was different as well.  While Disneyland used a pay-as-you-go pricing 
model, Six Flags went with a pay-one-price model to appeal to many families who liked 
knowing in advance how much a day at the park would cost.19
The surprising economic success of Six Flags Over Texas prompted the company to 
expand by opening another park in the southern United States.  Six Flags Over Georgia opened 
in Atlanta in 1967, making the company the first chain operator of theme parks.  When Six Flags 
Over Georgia proved to be another economic success, the company then opened Six Flags St. 
Louis in Missouri.  Through the next two decades and under multiple ownership changes, the 
company pursued an impressive expansion program across the rest of the nation, eventually 
opening or acquiring locations in the top ten designated market areas that serve approximately 
100 million people and 160 million people within a radius of 50 miles and 100 miles, 
respectively.20  From the company’s original single location in Texas, Six Flags has become the
Texas-arrogant, wanted his park to be for the people of Texas, not the entire country. He 
wouldn't need nation-wide attendance to support his park, and he created the budget to 
match. The concept also wasn't a universal one, but one that was very much Texas-bred.”).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/ 
(last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
20 Financial Reports, SIXFLAGS.COM, http://investors.sixflags.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=61629&p=irol-reportsOther (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
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largest regional theme park operator in the world.21  The company now operates a total of 18
parks, with 16 parks within the domestic United States, one park in Mexico City, and one park in 
Montreal.22  In the aggregate, the parks cover about 4,500 acres of real estate, with
approximately 800 rides, including over 120 roller coasters, making the park the leading provider 
of “thrill rides” in the industry.23  The parks hosts nearly 50 million customers every year, and
employs nearly 35,000 people.24  The majority of people in North America live within an eight-
hour drive of at least one of the parks.25
B. An Era of Expansions and Acquisitions
Although Angus Wynne was at the company’s helm during the park’s initial expansion 
into Atlanta and St. Louis, he sold the park to a limited partnership after just a few years.  By 
1971, the park was sold to a railroad company, Penn Central Corporation, which had itself filed 
bankruptcy the year before, and had bought the park in an attempt to diversify its income 
streams.26  After several more ownership changes, the company was eventually acquired by
Time Warner in 1993.27  The Time Warner management team brought considerable changes to
the park including the use of Warner Bros. character themes and attractions throughout the park 
21 Six Flags, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Dec. 31, 2012).
22 Overview, SIXFLAGS.COM, http://investors.sixflags.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61629&p=irol-
IRHome (last accessed Apr. 24, 2014).
23 Six Flags, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Dec. 31, 2012).
24 About Six Flags, SIXFLAGSJOBS.COM, http://www.sixflagsjobs.com/dynamicparkpage.php (last 
accessed, Apr. 11, 2014).
25 Id.
26 Brian Trumbore, The Collapse of Penn Central, BUYANDSELL.COM, http:// 
www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/education/history/2001/the_collapse_of_penn_central.html (last 
accessed Apr. 11, 2014); Penn Central Transportation Company, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, 
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/company.html? company=penn_central_transportation_co 
mpany (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
27 History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/ (last 
accessed Apr. 11, 2014)
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such as the Looney Tunes section for kids, and more recently the Gotham City section of the 
park.28  In 1998, the park’s current owner, Premier Parks bought the company for $1.86 billion,
but maintained the use of the Warner Bros. themes and characters through licensing 
agreements.29  Kieran Burke became the CEO in 1994 when the company changed its name from
Tierco to Premier Parks.30  The name change was made in part to brand the company as a
“premier” regional theme park operator.31  Under Burke’s leadership, the company began a new
era in its operations as it aggressively expanded with the acquisition of multiple park properties, 
including international locations as well.32
Before Premier Parks acquired the company, it had successfully undertaken a strategic 
plan to purchase amusement parks across the United States and upon purchase of Six Flags 
Theme Parks quickly began to transform several of the previously acquired parks into Six Flags 
sites.33  Through the 1990’s and early 2000’s the Oklahoma-based real estate company acquired
over twenty parks including locations in Mexico, Germany, Holland, Canada, and Belgium.34
Kieran E. Burke had been hired as president and CEO of Premier Parks in 1989, and was 
responsible for the company’s shift from real estate to theme parks.35  By the mid 2000’s Six
Flags had built up a serious amount of debt as a result of the previous expansion, and began to 
sell off some of their parks in an attempt to offset this debt.36  In 2005, it was reported that the
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Premier Parks, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
companyhistories/premier-parks-inc-history/ (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. (Premier Parks was originally Tierco Group, Inc.)
35 Id.
36 The Roots of Six Flags Entertainment Corp., WORDPRESS.COM (Feb. 10, 2011), http://
thekidleahey.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/the-roots-of-six-flags-entertainment-corp/.
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company was in over $2 billion of debt, and was facing criticism by many including the former 
president of Six Flags, Ned DeWitt.37  DeWitt stated that the string of acquisitions didn’t make
sense, characterizing the purchases as “mania” and part of “crazed acquisition process” making 
the company owners of multiple properties “they just couldn’t bring value to.”38
When Daniel Snyder became interested in purchasing Six Flags, he was well known as 
the young billionaire owner of the Washington Redskins.  Often disparagingly portrayed in the 
media, he has been called “prickly” and “imperious” due to his demanding personality.39
Snyder’s interest in the company was in part due to Six Flag’s highly leveraged status; the 
company had continued to plunge more deeply into debt and the current owners were looking for 
a purchaser.  Along with over a decade of overambitious acquisitions the company was also 
suffering from the after-effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which had effected a 
significant downturn in the theme park industry.40  Analysts also attributed the declines in Six
Flags attendance to sloppy operational management at some parks, opining that previous 
overexpansion resulted in less attention to detail at some locations as well as acquisitions of 
several generally weak amusement park properties.41  CEO Kieran Burke fielded such comments
by pointing to the overall strong performance of the parks during the first half of 2005 and 
attributing such performance to new attractions, improved services, and an advertising campaign 
featuring “Mr. Six” a geriatric character who danced to the late-90’s dance song “We Like to 
37 Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, NEWS12 (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.kxii.com/
home/headlines/1724681.html (reporting that DeWitt was Six Flags president from 1973 to 
1982).
38 Id.
39 Anthony, Brown, Redeeming Daniel Snyder’s Rep, REDSKINSHOGHEAVEN.COM (Sep. 25, 
2010).
40 Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, NEWS12 (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.kxii.com/
home/headlines/1724681.html (reporting that the downturn began to show signs of reversing in 
late 2005).
41 Id.
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Party” and who had become a popular advertising character.42
II. A Proxy Takeover
A. Key Players
At the time Daniel Snyder began positioning himself to take control of Six Flags he was 
not only well known as the owner of the Washington Redskins, he was also becoming a 
considerably polarizing figure to many of the team’s fans.  Snyder had purchased the Redskins in 
1999 when the franchise had gross revenues of $162 million.  By 2005, media reported that this 
number had nearly doubled under Snyder’s leadership, and the company’s SEC filings reported 
$300 million in gross revenues.  Portrayed by many as brash, cocky, and arrogant, Snyder was 
the owner of a marketing firm and worth an estimated $500 million at the time he made his bid 
to purchase the Redskins.43  He had no experience managing a sports team.  However, despite
the fact that the Redskins floundered on the field during Snyder’s tenure as owner, the franchise 
had continued to rapidly increase in value.44  In fact, the franchise’s most recent SEC filing
showed revenues have grown to $381 million, with a team value of $1.7 billion.45  One
commentator noted the Redskins’ increase in value might lead one to believe that “if not a 
football genius, [Snyder was] at least a capable businessman.”46  Snyder certainly seemed to
42 Id. (paraphrasing Burke, “the better recent performance reflects an investment program that 
has added new attractions in many parks, initiatives to improve services to guests and an 
advertising campaign featuring ‘Mr. Six,’ a dancing elderly man in a tuxedo.”). 
43 Harry Jaffe, The Dan Snyder You Don’t Know, WASHINGTONIAN (Sept. 1, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/sports/the-dan-snyder-you-dont-know/. 
44 Mike Jones, Redskins Rank Third On Forbes’ List of Most Valuable NFL Franchises, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/football-insider/ 
wp/2013/08/14/redskins-rank-third-on-forbes-list-of-most-valuable-nfl-franchises/. 
45 Jeff Clabaugh, Redskins Team Value Rises to $1.7 Billion, WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL 
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2013/08/14/redskins-team-value-
rises-to-17.html.  
46  Dave McKenna, Downward Spiral, SLATE MAGAZINE (May 3, 2010), http://www.slate.com/
articles/sports/sports_nut/2010/05/downward_spiral.html. 
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believe his tenure as owner of the football franchise made him well-equipped to manage a theme 
park, characterizing his team ownership as proving his “track record of success in venue-based 
entertainment.”47  During Snyder’s takeover campaign, he referred to himself as a “proven
creator of value” who was qualified to lead the management team of Six Flags due to his ability 
to increase revenues and facilitate stock price appreciation.48
Along with installing himself as the new chairman of Six Flags’ board of directors, 
Snyder also wanted to make his good friend, Mark Shapiro, CEO of the company.49  Shapiro,
who had left a prestigious job as an executive at ESPN, was immediately lauded as a “former 
ESPN programming whiz,” who would help reinvigorate the struggling theme park.50  Shapiro
threw his not insignificant support behind Snyder’s takeover efforts in late 2005.51  The duo then
began a sizeable campaign to gain the support of Six Flags investors to market their plan to take 
control of the company, and chartered a jet to fly them across the country to sell their idea to 
company investors who held large percentages of stock.52  Their efforts were rewarded when
New York investor, Simon Glick, who owned nearly ten percent of the company, stated his 
intentions to vote in favor of Snyder’s proposal.53  They were eventually able to attract the
47 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 15 (Oct. 2005).
48 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 17 (Oct. 2005).
49 Jaffe, supra note 43 (reporting that Snyder first took notice of Shapiro in 2003, who was a 
rising star at ESPN at the time. The two were friends first and took family vacations together 
before Snyder actually asked Shapiro whether he would ever be interested in running Six Flags).
50 Mark Hyman, The Batman and Robin of Six Flags, BUSINESSWEEK, (May 7, 2006), http://
www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-05-07/the-batman-and-robin-of-six-flags.
51 Annys Shin, Major Six Flags Holder Backs Snyder Takeover, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 
3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/02/
AR2005110202774.html.
52 Id.
53 Id. (reporting Snyder’s takeover bid “For his gambit to succeed, Snyder, Six Flags' largest 
shareholder, with a stake of about 11.7 percent, needs owners of a majority of company shares to 
support him. More than 70 percent of Six Flags' shares are controlled by seven investors. In 
addition to Snyder and Glick, other major investors include Omaha fund manager Wallace
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support of other heavyweight investors, most notably Bill Gate’s Cascade Investment.  They 
received an additional boost from a report by the nation’s largest shareholder-advisory firm, 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), which recommended that shareholders vote to replace 
the current directors with Snyder and his proposed team.54
Shapiro had been with ESPN for 12 years when he joined Snyder’s efforts to take over 
Six Flags.55  He was vocal about both his passion for the Six Flags venture as well as his
personal high regard for Snyder and his confidence in Snyder’s capacity as a strategic 
businessman.56  In response to speculation that Snyder had offered him a financial windfall to
leave ESPN, with as much as $10 million in guaranteed salary and bonuses, Shapiro answered 
that he felt that Six Flags was an ideal job opportunity, stating “I would never, ever leave what I 
view as one of the best jobs in America, unless . . . [t]he subject matter . . . [is] something I’m 
passionate about.”57  On his opinion of Snyder, who was tactfully referred to as an “independent
thinker, and not easy to work for,” Shapiro stated that Snyder was a family man who was also 
loyal, honest, and a winner who “has made people a lot of money.”58
Weitz, who controls about 10.6 percent of the shares, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates, who 
owns about 11.5 percent.”). 
54 Id.; Dean Starkman, Investor Adviser Backs Snyder on Six Flags, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/15/
AR2005111501592.html. 
55 Online Extra: Why Mark Shapiro Left ESPN, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 16, 2005) 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-10-16/online-extra-why-mark-shapiro-left-espn. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (Quoting Shapiro “If somebody said to me tomorrow: ‘You can run a bottled-water 
company, and we'll give you $20 million up front,’ I wouldn't do it.  I've got to love what I'm 
doing.  I'm not leaving from ESPN.  I'm leaving to go somewhere.  There's a big difference.”).
58 Id. (Quoting Shapiro on Snyder “There's what you read and what you get.  I'm not going to 
say everything you read, there's no truth to it.  I've been with him.  Our wives know each other.  
He's a family man, which I love.  Great children.  I have met his mom.  She is salt of the earth.  
And his best friend in life is his dad…  Anyone who puts so much stock in his family can't be 
half-bad. Beyond that, he is extremely loyal to anyone he works with or who works for him. He 
has 
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Snyder wanted to give a director seat to another longtime personal friend, Dwight Schar.  
Schar was the founder of NVR, Inc., a fortune 500 company that is reported as being the sixth 
leading home builder in the United States, and third in terms of revenue.59  Schar was also well
known for his significant philanthropic endeavors and heavy participation in Republican politics, 
an interest that he shared with Snyder.60  Originally a high school teacher, Schar’s first
experience in the home building industry was selling homes on the weekends.61  He eventually
founded NVHomes in 1980, which he later renamed NVR after acquiring his former employer, 
Ryan Homes in 1987.62  Like Shapiro, Schar was intensely loyal to Snyder despite criticism of
his management style and had had a business relationship with him since Snyder had approached 
him about becoming part owner of the Redskins.63  Snyder didn’t need cash at that time, but he
wanted to pay down the team’s debt burden.64  Schar took advantage of the opportunity and
bought a 15-percent interest in the team for $200 million in 2003.65  Tapping the talents of Mark
Shapiro and Dwight Schar, and touting them as his handpicked management team, Snyder was 
made people a lot of money.  He's a winner.  And he wears his emotions on his sleeve.  If you 
don't like everything he says, at least he's not lying to you. I admire that.”). 
59 Dick Clark Productions Acquired by Redzone Capital, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (Jun. 19, 2007), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070619005639/en/dick-clark-productions-
Acquired-Redzone-Capital#.Uy8-eShq5UQ; Gretchen Morgenson, Who Benefits From This 
Buyback, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/business/
yourmoney/03gret.html?ref=nvrinc&_r=0. (NVR is the 10th largest seller of residential housing 
in the United States).
60 Billionaire Profile: Dwight Schar, MONEYEDUP (Oct. 14, 2011), http://
www.moneyedup.com/2011/10/billionaire-profile-dwight-schar/ (discussing Schar who was one 
of President Bush’s largest fundraisers during his re-election campaign, and also held a position 
on the Bush inaugural committee).  
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Jaffe, supra note 43, (Discussing Snyder’s relationship with Schar “In the spring of 2003, Dan 
Snyder invited Dwight Schar to lunch at the Capital Grill on Pennsylvania Avenue. ‘I have a list 
of 100 people I would consider selling part of the Redskins to,’ he said. ‘You are in the top 
three.’”).
64 Id.
65 Id.
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able to successfully sell his idea to many of the company’s shareholders.  In addition to ISS’s 
overwhelmingly positive report on Snyder’s takeover intentions, another positive review came 
from Glen Reid, a Bear Stearns analyst, who stated that Snyder’s shareholder activism was “one 
potential bright light for Six Flags.”66  While other analysts blamed debt as the reason for the
company’s problems, Reid credited slowed spending such as the company’s halted purchases of 
normally lucrative investments like new rides as the reason for the problems, “[i]n order to 
maintain high attendance rates, you have to spend money.”67  Spending money to make money
was something Snyder had proven himself to be immensely good at while managing the 
Redskins.  That he understood the particular importance of spending money on marketing was 
well known to people familiar with the industry.  According to Robert Johnson, owner of the 
Charlotte Bobcats basketball team, “If there is an asset that is under-marketed and [Snyder] 
thinks he can do it better, there is gold in them there hills for him.”68
B. Convincing the Shareholders
When Snyder began to aggressively pursue control of the company he filed a proposal 
with the SEC under his limited liability company, Red Zone, that detailed his strategy.  “It’s time 
for a change” was the central theme of the filing.69  He argued that the company needed to
conduct a purge of properties that weren’t critical to the management plan and also overhaul the 
company’s advertising and marketing strategies to establish a “clean, safe and fun” image for the 
66 Bill Burbaker, For Snyder, The Six Flags Thrill Is Gone, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 
25,2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51931-2005Feb24_3.html.
67 Michael Barbaro, Gates, Snyder Interested in Change at Six Flags, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50718-2004Aug31_2.html.
68 Id.
69 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Oct. 2005).
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company.70  Snyder contended that under the then-current management team, the company was
experiencing a loss of shareholder value in the billions of dollars.71  He stated that the company
had recorded negative earnings from 2000 to 2005 and that management had responded poorly 
by citing weather as the source of the decreasing crowds.72  Throughout the proposal, Snyder
compared Six Flags to the park’s closest competitor, Cedar Fair, noting that Cedar Fair had 
consistently outperformed Six Flags for the past five years as reflected by a comparison of their 
indexed stock prices.73
According to Snyder, Cedar Fair guests spent an average of $5.50 more per visit than the 
typical Six Flags guest.74  He speculated that if Six Flags could accomplish the same, the
company would generate $200 million in incremental revenue and approximately $1 billion in 
shareholder revenue.75  In support of his argument that the park was in serious need of an image
overhaul to successfully appeal to families, particularly those with young children, Snyder then 
cited media reports of several fights that had recently broken out in two of the parks.76
According to Snyder, the Six Flags brand was being seriously damaged as a result of such 
occurrences.77  He also believed the company had been “burning cash” for years and was over-
concerned about reducing its debt burden, while management had rewarded itself with over-
70 Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, NEWS12 (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.kxii.com/ 
home/headlines/1724681.html.
71 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Oct. 2005) (Snyder based this number on 
previous share counts of Six Flags’ public filings).
72 Id. at 7.
73 Id. at 6 (stating that from 2000 to 2005, Cedar Fair saw consistent gains in stock prices going 
from right around 100.0 to 164.0, while Six Flags went from over 100.0 to under 39.6).
74 Id. at 8.
75 Id. at 8 (predicting that if Six Flags could achieve the same per cap spending as Cedar Fair it 
would add approximately $1 billion in shareholder value).
76 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 10 (Oct. 2005) (reporting that the fights 
cited in the presentation occurred in the summer of 2005 at Six Flags Astro World in Houston, 
TX, and Six Flags Magic Mountain in Valencia, CA.).
77 Id.
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generous compensation packages.78  In particular, he noted that during the previous year, CEO
Burke and CFO Dannhauser had received stock options not tied to company performance; grants 
that equaled 80 percent of the total stock options granted to the company.79
The proposed management team included Snyder himself, Mark Shapiro, and Dwight 
Schar.  These “new and passionate leaders” were committed to reinvigorating Six Flags, which 
was characterized as a company that “lacks any sense of passion, pride, and enthusiasm.”80
Snyder’s new management team would undertake an operating plan and capital management 
strategy that would vastly improve the company’s ailing bottom line by increasing attendance 
and revenue, decreasing expenses, and ultimately maximizing shareholder value.81
The new team’s strategy began with seeking stockholder consent for the takeover, and the 
ousting of key members of the current board, including Kieran Burke, James Dannhauser, and 
Stanley Schuman, who were respectively the company’s CEO, CFO, and Director.82  As the
managing partner of the largest shareholder of Six Flags, Snyder and his proposed management 
team owned 11.7% of the company’s stock.83  The suggested strategy for the proxy takeover also
contained a timeline of relevant events, including the initial Schedule 13D filed in August of 
2004 when Red Zone purchased over 8 million shares of Six Flags, bringing the entity’s 
ownership to over 5%, which is the threshold amount required for the mandatory Schedule 13D 
78 Id. at 12 (stating that Burke and Dannhauser received stock and grants not tied to company 
performance and they received 80% of the stock options granted to the company). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 17.  
81 Id. at 15. 
82 Id. at 20 (proposing an amendment to the company’s bylaws to accomplish several things, 
including the following: limit the number of directors on the board to seven, require that the 
vacancies on the board be filled only by stockholder majority vote, and repeal every provision of 
the company’s bylaws or amendments adopted after September 13, 2004.). 
83 Proxy Adviser Backs Six Flags Takeover, DALLAS BUSINESS JOURNAL (Nov. 15, 2005), http://
www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2005/11/14/daily16.html 
Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy 17 
filing.84  The timeline also reflected Six Flag’s then-current management team’s unsatisfactory
response to Snyder’s repeated efforts to engage in constructive talks for improving company 
operations.85  In Snyder’s Schedule 13D filing he attached a copy of a letter he had written to the
Six Flags Board of Directors which described his rebuffed efforts to participate in decision-
making with the company: 
“Since current management of the Company apparently feels its time is better 
spent speaking with attorneys rather than exploring ways to improve shareholder 
value, I am writing to request a meeting with the non-officer outside directors of 
the Company's Board of Directors.  I am very concerned about the consistently 
disappointing performance of the Company.  This must be addressed immediately 
- shareholders should not have to suffer through one more period of poor financial
performance or one more announcement that the Company will miss its expected
numbers.”86
Unsurprisingly Six Flags had strong criticism for Snyder’s ideas, arguing that his plans would 
undermine the sales process and ultimately lessen shareholder value.87  CEO Kieran Burke sent a
letter to shareholders communicating his disapproval of Snyder’s plans describing Snyder and 
his selected management team as “people with no experience in the theme-park industry [that] 
would be in a position to implement so-called ideas that we think are dangerous and potentially 
destructive of shareholder value.”88
Undeterred, Snyder continued to pursue his takeover bid, arguing that specific changes 
were needed in order to maximize shareholder value.  In proxy disclosures, he identified a 
84 Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 13D), at 2 (Sep. 2, 2004). (Red Zone’s purchase of 
8,150,000 shares of Six Flags stock equaled 8.8% ownership of the company).
85 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 20 (Oct. 2005). (stating “the Company 
ignored our suggestions and failed to implement any alternative strategies that would deliver 
acceptable results for shareholders,” and “[t]he Independent Directors made it clear that they 
would not entertain any of Mr. Snyder’s suggestions.”).
86 Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 13D), at 4 (Sep. 2, 2004).
87 Paul Monies, Large Shareholder Files Against Six Flags Sale NFL Redskins’ Owner Backed 
By Major Investor, NEWSOK (Nov. 3, 2005), http://newsok.com/large-shareholder-files-
againstsix-flags-salebrnfl-redskins-owner-backed-by-major-investor/article/2918261.
88 Id.
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handful of areas that needed improvement, including advertising and marketing, concessions, 
sponsorships, and merchandise.  Advertising and marketing could be better focused towards 
families with young children as well as teenagers.89  This was opposed to the company’s current
advertising strategy which he characterized as targeted only at teenagers and Generation X.90
Regarding improvements to concessions, Snyder argued that outsourcing was necessary and that 
selling rights to the park’s key food items would allow name brand consumer foods companies to 
benefit from the strategic relationship.91  By engaging in sponsorship partnerships, Six Flags
could collect fees from third parties in exchange for providing lucrative marketing opportunities 
within the parks.92  Similarly, park merchandise could benefit from co-branding as well.  Snyder
envisioned co-branding opportunities that would include partnerships in a broad array of areas 
such as action sports, video games, music, movies, and more.93
Staying true to his reputation for boosting the bottom-line by aggressively raising prices 
on incremental revenue streams, Snyder planned to increase parking fees, and allow groups to 
rent the parks and parking lots for special events.94  He also intended to create tiered pricing for
package deals, develop a loyalty program, and eliminate any unnecessary discounts, which had 
89 Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Oct. 2005).
90 Id. (Snyder argued that current Six Flags advertising had no clear message and used an overly 
expensive advertising campaign).
91 Id.
92 Id. (Characterizing the current sponsorship relationships as using “tired and dated brands that 
generate little recognition by children.”).
93 Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Oct, 2005). (Arguing that the company’s 
current merchandise offerings suffered from “tired and dated brands that generate little 
recognition among children.”).
94 McKenna, supra note 46, (reporting “Snyder's run atop Six Flags was a debacle from the start. 
His shtick was much the same as he'd used with the Redskins, where he put a price tag on 
anything without one (charging admission to training camp) or added a bigger number to 
everything with one (quadrupling parking fees in a decade)… Just as he'd done at FedEx Field 
(which was called Jack Kent Cooke Stadium before Snyder sold the naming rights for $7.6 
million per year through 2025), Snyder inflated the parking rates at Six Flags lots all over the 
country.”).
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been previously characterized as cheapening the whole experience.95  Highlighting Dwight
Schar’s real estate expertise, the shareholder proposal stated that excess acreage owned by Six 
Flags could be re-zoned, revalued, and sold to third parties to help reduce the company’s debt 
and save on property taxes.96  Snyder closed the proposal by requesting shareholder support and
stating that his team was unable to block a sale of the company since they were a minority on the 
board, but as majority owners they would vote in favor of any transaction that would offer the 
highest value to shareholders.97
Snyder’s plan attracted the support of many, including former Six Flags president, Ned 
DeWitt, who was quoted as responding to Snyder’s SEC filing, “I haven’t ever met Dan Snyder 
… but it sounds like he’s dead on.”  Dennis Speigel, president of International Theme Park 
Services, attributed the park’s declines to “flawed business plans” such as overly discounted 
ticket prices, and management decisions made in desperation.98  One analyst is quoted as stating
that then-current CEO, Kieran Burke, was seen more as a politician than an operating CEO who 
was willing to get involved in the details of running the parks.99  In a passionate letter entitled
95 McKenna, supra note 46; Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE 
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/money/article_084b70a7-9e3d-5530-
b255-85f88d8a34ad.html?mode=jqm (paraphrasing Six Flag’s former president, Ned DeWitt, 
who stated that the company offered too many discount admission schemes that reduce revenue 
from entry fees forcing the company to attempt to recoup those losses through the sale of other 
in-park merchandise).
96 Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Oct, 2005).
97 Id. at 34 (stating that Six Flags’ sale announcement was “merely a defensive tactic.”).
98 Id. at 13 (quoting Dennis Speigel “They’ve had flawed business plans. They prostituted the 
front gate, and put so many discounts out in the marketplace that that’s only way the consumer 
is going to come. Why pay $44 when you could bring in a Coke can or a McDonald’s wrapper 
and get in for $5? The more you discount, it’s like a junkie shooting up heroin – the more you 
shoot it, the more you need it. They began doing things in desperation to build the business, but 
what they were really doing was strangling their business.”).
99 Id. at 13 (quoting David Miller, “The problem with Kieran Burke is that he’s perceived as a 
politician, and that he’s not perceived as an operating CEO. He’s not seen on the Street as a 
rollup-your-sleeves-and-run-these-parks kind of guy.”).
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“What is Dan Snyder So Afraid Of and Why is He Trying to Rush You into Voting,” Burke 
urged shareholders to reject Snyder’s proposals, and described the takeover bid as an attempt to 
prevent shareholders from obtaining their fair share of value through a sale of the company:  
In our view, the last thing [Snyder] wants to see is a successful sale of Six Flags. 
We believe he wants our sale process to fail so that he can take effective control 
of Six Flags without paying full value for all of your shares.  We think that if 
Snyder wants control of Six Flags, he should pay stockholders for it! … In our 
judgment, Snyder’s attempts to sling mud at our directors and management and 
denigrate the sale process are simply a tactic to divert stockholders from focusing 
on what’s important.  Don’t be rushed by Snyder into giving your consent before 
you have the opportunity to evaluate all of your alternatives!100
In response to Snyder’s shareholder proposal, Six Flags filed a counter-proposal that 
touted their undergoing attempts to sell the company as “maximizing value for all 
stockholders” that was “designed to attract the best possible transaction for ALL 
stockholders and provide full and fair value for ALL Six Flags shares.”101  The
recommendation statement also attempted to reassure shareholders that the current 
strategic plan was working and the company was continuing to grow under current 
management, “[the company has] significantly outperformed our peers in 2005 and have 
set the stage for substantial future growth.”102  Directly responding to Snyder’s proposal,
Six Flags pronounced the plans as “neither original nor creative” that would “put your 
investment at risk,” and “demonstrate a significant lack of understanding of and 
experience in the theme park business.”103  In particular, the counter-proposal stated that
Snyder’s plans to engage in strategic vendor relationships for concessions and 
100 Six Flags Sends Letter to Stockholders; Urges Stockholders to Preserve Their Choices by 
Rejecting Red Zone's Consent, SIX FLAGS FOR INVESTORS (Nov. 11, 2005), http://
phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=61629&p=irol-newsArticle_pf&ID=781873&highlight=.
101 Six Flags, Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, (Schedule 14D-9), at 3 (Nov. 2, 2005).
102 Id. at 7.
103 Id. at 19.
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merchandise was “[c]ontracting away highly profitable concession business,” and 
abandoning the “key teen demographic, which represents 30% of attendance (10 
million).”104  Wisely alluding to the difference in customers between industries, the filing
noted that theme park guests would react less elastically to changing pricing and discount 
strategies than football fans of a monopoly NFL team.105
In spite of Burke’s best attempts to characterize Snyder’s plans as “misguided” and 
“backwards,” Snyder’s proposal had successfully captured the support of many of the company’s 
shareholders.106  Consequently, on November 22, 2005, Snyder released a press statement stating
that 57 percent of Six Flags’ shareholders had voted to support his consent solicitation.107
Revealing the highly contentious nature of the takeover, Six Flags quickly responded that the 
vote was subject to verification, and called for an independent audit of the vote.108  After IVS
Associates Inc., (a leading inspector of corporate elections), certified that more than 57 percent 
of votes cast were for Red Zone, Six Flags finally released a short statement conceding Snyder’s 
win, “[the] Board of Directors has unanimously appointed Mr. Daniel M. Snyder as non-
executive Chairman of the Board of Directors.”  All of the proposals contained in the consent 
solicitation were adopted, including the amendments to the company’s by-laws.109  Red Zone
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 27, (stating “[p]ro sports franchise reflects monopoly in local market with die-hard fan 
base” that has “[s]old out every home game since 1966 regardless of weather, economy or team 
performance.”) 
106  Six Flags Sends Letter to Stockholders; Urges Stockholders to Preserve Their Choices by 
Rejecting Red Zone's Consent, SIX FLAGS FOR INVESTORS (Nov. 11, 2005), http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=61629&p=irol-newsArticle_pf&ID=781873&highlight=. 
107 Redskins Owner Gains Six Flags Board Seats, ATLANTA BUSINESS CHRONICLE (Nov. 29, 
2005), http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2005/11/28/daily10.html. (highlighting the 
bitter nature of the proxy fight, Six Flags initially responded by saying that the vote was subject 
to verification).  
108 Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 13D), at 3 (Sep. 2, 2004).
109 Id.
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released a separate statement proudly announcing “[t]he shareholders have spoken—and we 
would like to thank all of them for this vote of confidence.”110
III. PRE-BANKRUPTCY
A. Old Tactics and A New Venture
As expected, there were some parallels regarding Snyder’s management of the Redskins 
and his management of Six Flags.  Throughout his management of the Redskins although Snyder 
was unable to facilitate actual wins on the football field, he had become adept at getting the team 
to deliver incredible profits.111  According to some commentators, Snyder’s substantial profit-
making ability was the result of “gouging fans at every opportunity and placing sponsored ads on 
anything that moves—even other ads.”112  During his run as the Redskin’s owner, his penchant
for aggressive price increasing coupled with the team’s lack of wins caused significant criticism 
from fans concerning what many considered a failure to produce a quality product—that of a 
winning football team.113  One of Redskin fans’ most disliked moves was Snyder’s decision to
charge admission for training camp workouts.114  Snyder later conceded that this decision was a
mistake, reflecting that it was a “dumb move.”115  But the damage had already been done; he’d
alienated many Redskins fans, and solidified a public perception of himself as not much more 
110 Six Flags Admits Defeat In Takeover Fight, UPI (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.upi.com/
Business_News/2005/11/29/Six-Flags-admits-defeat-in-takeover-fight/UPI-95811133282001/.
111 McKenna, supra note 46.
112 Dashiell Bennett, The 14 Worst Business Practices of Redskins Owner Daniel Snyder, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-14-worst-
businesspractices-of-redskins-owner-daniel-snyder-2010-11?op=1.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Jaffe, supra note 43.
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than a greedy businessman whose only concern was continually increasing profits.116
In many ways Snyder’s management of Six Flags was similar to his management of the 
Redskins.  He immediately raised prices on admission, concessions, and parking.117  The high
parking prices stimulated nearby businesses to offer parking in their own lots allowing Six Flags 
customers to save money by walking to the park.118  Snyder then went to local authorities and
through heavy lobbying accomplished a ban on off-site parking practices citing a concern for 
pedestrian safety.119  The parking ordinance was passed despite the fact that no injuries or
accidents had been reported in the past two decades that the private lots had been in existence.120
Snyder had previously used the exact same pedestrian safety argument when attempting to keep 
Redskins fans from taking advantage of off-site parking options in the vicinity of the 
FedExField.121
To his credit, Snyder did more than raise prices in attempts to increase the parks’ 
profitability.  True to plans revealed in his proxy disclosures, Snyder also increased character 
presence in the parks, using characters like Thomas the Tank Engine and Bugs Bunny to better 
appeal to families.122  The company also began strategic partnerships with recognizable food
116 Id. (reporting Snyder’s decision to charge admission for training camp “In 2003 Snyder 
moved training camp from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, to Redskins Park in Loudoun County.  
[Snyder] opened it to fans.  He charged admission.  And a parking fee.  ’That was another 
mistake,’ he says.  ‘Charging fans to see training camp.  Dumb move.’”).  
117  Dave McKenna, Six Months of SIX Flagging: Looking Back at a Half-Year of Snyder 
Theme-Park Disasters, WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (May 16, 2008). http://
www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/35590/six-months-of-six-flagging. 
118 Andrew Beaujon and Erik Wemple, Dan Snyder Lawsuit: A Complete Analysis, TBD (Feb. 
4, 2011), http://www.tbd.com/articles/2011/02/dan-snyder-lawsuit-a-complete-
analysis-49871_page4.html. 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Tom Hals, Six Flags Emerges From Bankruptcy, REUTERS (May 3, 2010), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/03/us-sixflags-idUSTRE6422RF20100503.
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vendors like Papa Johns, Johnny Rockets, Cold Stone Creamery, and Heinz.123  Heinz, in
particular, accomplished an impressive duel marketing campaign in return for being the “Official 
Ketchup of Six Flags Theme Parks.”124  In attempts to facilitate a more family-friendly
atmosphere the company barred bikini tops and restricted smoking to small, designated areas on 
the outskirts of park premises.125  While competitors were investing in expensive rides to lure
customers, Six Flags was doing the opposite and investing in more kiddie rides and modest roller 
coasters in order to cut costs and attract families.126  The newly opened Dark Knight coaster at
the Six Flags location in New Jersey was much smaller than many of its competitors and was 
encased in a dark building that effectively disguised its size; it was also comparatively low-cost 
compared to its competitors.127
B. Customer Perception, and Shareholder Response
Despite the significant increase in average in-park spending per customer, park guests 
were less than impressed as reflected by attendance numbers that continued to decrease under 
Snyder’s management.128  By early 2008, the company’s stock had lost three quarters of its
value.129  Stock prices fell even more when media reported that the company was attempting to
obtain liquor licenses for Six Flags Over Texas and Hurricane Harbor, both located in 
123 William Spain, Raft of New Licensing, Sponsor Deals For Six Flags, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 
12, 2006), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/raft-of-new-licensing-sponsorship-deals-for-
sixflags.
124 Id.
125 Jeffrey McCracken, No Fun For Six Flags As Parks Face Slump—As Debt Looms, Smaller 
Coasters Are In, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 5, 2008).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Jeremiah McWilliams, Six Flags Tries to Ride It Out, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 23, 
2008), http://www.leisure-business.com/stl-post-dispatch1.html. (reporting that “[a]verage guest 
spending grew 13 percent to about $39 in the first quarter.”).
129 Dave McKenna, Six Months of SIX Flagging, WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (May 16, 2008). 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/35590/six-months-of-six-flagging.
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Arlington.130  To many people, this decision appeared directly at odds with Snyder’s initial
pledge to stockholders that he would focus on mothers with young children as well as youth.131
Media also reported that Six Flags Discovery Kingdom located in California had been named the 
worst park for elephants in the entire country, and had been the subject of concern by an animal 
rights group who requested an investigation by the federal government.132  The company took
another hit when an incident of a much more tragic nature occurred when a 14-year old girl’s 
feet were severed on the Superman free-fall ride at the company’s Kentucky park.133  Further bad
publicity occurred when a teenage boy was struck and killed by a roller coaster after he had 
climbed a protective fence.134
Six Flags’ shares first began to tumble in mid 2006, relatively shortly after the proxy 
takeover.  During 2006, the company lost $275 million, and the following year lost $328 
million.135  One of the most significant decreases in share value occurred the day after Shapiro
had made a particularly disconcerting announcement via conference call that the company no 
longer expected to meet its earnings projections and that revenue and attendance had 
decreased.136  The company announced that its debt burden was becoming difficult to manage
and that the leadership team was contemplating selling six of its theme parks, including one of its 
leading properties, the Magic Mountain park in California.137
To their credit, the new management team had followed through with many of the 
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 McCracken, supra note 125.
135 Id.
136 Vinnee Tong, Six Flags Shares Tumble; Debt Agencies Lower Outlook, CASPER STARTRIBUNE 
(Jun. 24, 2006), http://trib.com/business/six-flags-shares-tumble-debt-agencies-loweroutlook/
article_f33fd01a-8ce9-5601-9d2b-6aa970dec520.html.
137 Id.
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strategic plans that Snyder had detailed in his consent solicitation the year before.  As a result, 
the company had seen a positive increase in average spending per guest, but had experienced a 
decrease in sales of season passes.138  The price of season passes had been raised in an attempt to
attract higher-paying visitors and families as opposed to teenagers.139  This decrease offset any 
gains that the company had hoped to see from higher spending per visitor.  In addition, rumors 
that the company was considering selling their flagship park, Magic Mountain, was a shocking 
development for shareholders because it was one of the company’s most valuable locations.140
Shapiro validated these rumors when he made an announcement to this effect, and although sale 
proceedings were never initiated the statement probably served to further weaken investors’ 
perceptions about the company’s economic stability. 
In an interview a few months before Six Flags’ shares took a major hit in June of 2006, 
Shapiro communicated plans for the company to branch out with a more diverse entertainment 
package.  He felt that the company had focused too narrowly on just thrill rides, which he 
acknowledged were important but in his opinion not enough.141  However, he wanted the park to
have a more diverse entertainment options such as parades, fireworks, concerts, and celebrity 
appearances.142  Again, the management team was nearly single-mindedly focused on restoring a 
family atmosphere at the parks, a focus that produced a subtle but noticeable aversion for their 
previously popular demographic, teenagers.  By raising prices on season passes, the company 
had hoped to attract more families than teenage customers, but the tactic did not work as 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (reporting that the company’s debt burden was at a troubling level and that management 
was contemplating selling six of its theme parks, including the Magic Mountain park in 
California). 
141 Arthur Levine, Flagging Down Mark Shapiro, ABOUT.COM (Feb. 21, 2006), http://
themeparks.about.com/od/sixflagsarticles/a/shapiro2006.htm 
142 Id. 
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planned.  There was some concern that by raising entrance and parking fees, the company had 
priced itself out of some markets.143
Shapiro continued to insist that the company was making progress on its goal to de-
leverage itself and pointed to the recession as a potential positive for the company.144  Alluding
to the fact that theme parks are historically recession-resistant due to their appeal to local blue-
collar families who often choose theme parks over more expensive trips during a down economy, 
Shapiro vocalized his hope that the recession would increase revenues, “As parents elect to stay 
closer to home, we want to give them a family-friendly offering that’s a better value…  When the 
economy tightens, I think we’re well-positioned.”145  In another interview, Shapiro theorized that
high gas prices might also help the company in the same way by enticing cash-strapped families 
to take day trips closer to home, “It’s a working premise…  But no one knows for sure.  We’ve 
never had $4-a-gallon gas.  It’s obviously not the economic environment I would have 
chosen.”146  The company’s plans to trim about $55 million in operational costs were worrying
for some analysts who accurately predicted that the economic downturn in 2008 had the potential 
to hurt Six Flags more than previous downturns.147  Kit Spring, a Stifel Nicolaus analyst, stated
that if Six Flags cut its operations too deeply, customer satisfaction and revenue could drop.148
Despite reports that the company had seen an increase in revenues and had achieved a 
sharp reduction in losses, Six Flags began contemplating ways to avoid a Chapter 11 filing by 
143 McCracken, supra note 125.
144 Id.
145 McWilliams, supra note 128.
146 McCracken, supra note 125.
147 McWilliams, supra note 128.
148 Id.
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late 2008.149  In attempts to sidestep bankruptcy proceedings, Six Flags hired bankruptcy counsel
and financial advisors to assist with creditor negotiations and to help navigate its enormous debt 
load.150  The company’s CFO, Jeff Speed, confirmed the hiring of Chicago law firm, Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky, and Walker, along with investment bank, Houlihan, Lokey, Howard, and 
Zukin, stating “[o]ur creditors are very supportive, but obviously there are issues we need to 
address… We are trying to accomplish something on a consensual basis… That is always 
preferred, but I can't speculate on what the ultimate resolution will be.”151
IV. CHAPTER ELEVEN
A. Prepetition Indebtedness
a. Prepetition Credit Agreement
In May 2007, the Debtors had entered into a Pre-Petition Credit Agreement which provided 
for a $850 million term loan with a maturity date of April 2015, a revolving credit facility 
totaling $275 million (as well as letters of credit with the approximate amount of $30,132,885), 
and an uncommitted optional term loan tranche of up to $300 million.152  As of the date of filing,
approximately $835,125,000 of the term loan was outstanding, and approximately $270.6 million 
of the revolving debt was outstanding.153  The Debtors was required to make quarterly principal
payments on the term loan in the amount of $2,125,000 until the date of maturity.154  The
149 Jeffrey McCracken, Six Flags Braces for a Dive, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 13, 2009) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123690270788513649.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 34, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 
09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 240).
153 Id. at 37. The Debtors had paid the revolving debt down to $243,492,063, but in July 2009 
Debtors received a notice to draw approximately $27,000,000 in outstanding letters of credit, 
which increased the revolving debt to the stated figure.
154 Id. at 38.
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Debtors granted blanket security interests and mortgages on virtually all of their assets in order 
to secure the obligations under the Pre-Petition Credit Agreement.155
b. Derivative Financial Instruments
In February 2008, the Debtors entered into two Interest Swap Agreements that converted 
$600 million of the term loan in the Pre-Petition Credit Agreement into a fixed rate obligation.156
Each Interest Swap agreement was for a $300 million amount.157  As of the date of filing, the
counterparties to the Interest Swap Agreement had claims against the Debtors in the amount of 
$18.7 million.158
c. Unsecured Notes
As of the date of filing, the Debtors owed $1.27 billion related to fixed-rate Senior 
Unsecured Notes with various maturity dates and interest rates.159  There are five pools of
Unsecured Notes issued or guaranteed by the Debtors, including 2010 Notes, 2013 Notes, 2014 
Notes, 2015 Notes, and 2016 Notes.160  Each of these Unsecured Notes was subordinate to the
obligations under the Prepetition Credit Agreement.161
i. 2010 Notes
In February 2002, Six Flag, Inc. (“SFI”) issued $480 million of 8 7/8% senior notes that 
would mature in 2010.162  SFI later repurchased approximately $200 million of the 2010 Notes
and exchanged approximately $150 million of the notes for 2016 Notes.163  The 2010 Notes
155 Id.
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161 Id. at 40.
162 Id. at 38.
163 Id.
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required annual interest payments of $11,633,000.164
ii. 2013 Notes
In April 2003, SFI issued $430 million of 9 ¾% senior notes that would mature in 2013.165
SFI subsequently repurchased $56 million of the 2013 Notes and exchanged $231,559,000 of the 
2013 Notes for 2016 Notes.166  These notes required annual interest payments of $13,888,000.167
iii. 2014 Notes
In December 2003, SFI issued $325 million of 9 5/8% senior notes that would mature in 
2014.168  In January 2005 SFI would issue an additional $195 million worth of 2014 Notes.169
SFI would late repurchase $55,350,000 of the 2014 Notes and exchange $149,863,000 of the 
2014 Notes for 2016 Notes.170  These notes required annual interest payments of $30,298,000.171
iv. 2015 Notes
In November 2004, SFI issued $299 million of notes that would mature in 2015.172  The
notes would be convertible to SFI common stock at a rate of 157.4803 shares for every $1,000 of 
2015 Notes.173  In 2007, SFI repurchased $19 million of the 2015 Notes.174  These notes required
an annual interest payment of  $12.6 million.175
v. 2016 Notes
In June 2008, there was a private debt exchange in which the Debtors issued $400 million 
164 Id.
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166 Id.
167 Id. at 39.
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169 Id.
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175 Id.
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of 12 ¼% senior notes of Six Flags Operations Inc. due in 2016 which were exchanged for 
$149,223,000 of the 2010 Notes, $231,559,000 of the 2013 Notes, and $149,263,000 of the 2014 
Notes.176  The goal of the exchange was to reduce debt, extend maturities, and annual interest
expenses.177  The 2016 Notes required annual interest payments of $49 million.178
d. Preferred Income Equity Redeemable Shares
In January 2001, the Debtors issued 11.5 million Preferred Income Equity Redeemable 
Shares (“PIERS”), for a $277,834,000 amount.179  Each PIERS represents one one-hundredth
(1/100) interest in a share of Debtor’s 7.25% convertible preferred stock.180  Under the terms of
the PIERS, they were required to be redeemed on August 15, 2009 for cash at 100% of the 
liquidation preference.181  This would have been approximately $287.5 million plus accrued
unpaid dividends in the amount of $31.3 million.182
e. Time Warner and Guarantees of Partnership Parks Loan
When the Debtors acquired Six Flags from Time Warner in 1998, they guaranteed certain 
obligations related to Six Flags Over Georgia and Six Flags Over Texas (together the 
“Partnership Parks”).183  The obligations related to Six Flags Over Georgia would continue until
2027 and those related to Six Flags Over Texas would continue until 2028.184  These obligations
included minimum annual distributions to partners in the Partnership Parks, minimum capital 
expenditures at each park during rolling 5-year periods based on 6% of each parks revenues, and 
176 Id.
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an annual offer to purchase a maximum number of 5% per year of the limited partnership 
units.185
When the Debtors acquired Six Flags in 1998, they also entered into a Subordinated 
Indemnity Agreement with Time Warner, Inc. and certain Time Warner affiliates.186  Time
Warner guaranteed all the obligations that Debtors owe to the Partnership Parks, and under the 
Subordinated Indemnity Agreement, Time Warner would receive record title to any entity that 
had or would later purchase any limited partnership units of the Partnership Parks.187  In
addition, the Debtors were required to deposit a calculated sum into escrow as a potential source 
of capital in the event that Time Warner had to fulfill its guarantee of the obligations to 
Partnership Parks.188  In the event of default of the Subordinated Indemnity Agreement, Time
Warner would take control of the entities that own the limited partnership units and Debtors’ 
licensing agreement would terminate.189
B. Key Events Leading to Chapter 11
The Debtors faced challenges for years before filing Chapter 11.  These challenges, most 
notably market conditions and an over-leveraged balance sheet, made it extremely difficult to 
achieve profitability.  The Debtors to sought deals and agreements to overcome these challenges.  
Ultimately, however, such deals would not be enough to provide viable financial restructuring. 
a. Market Conditions
The Debtors pointed to challenging market conditions, including the H1N1 Swine Flu 
break out and the deterioration of the U.S. and world economy in 2008 and 2009 as factors that 
185 Id.
186 Id. at 35.
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exacerbated an over-leveraged balance sheet, which contributed to their need to file Chapter 11.  
i. Swine Flu
The CDC estimated that 14 million to 34 million cases of H1N1 Swine Flu cases occurred 
between April and October 2009.190  Furthermore, the CDC estimated that 63,000 to 153,000
cases of H1N1 Swine Flu cases resulted in hospitalization and 2,500 to 6,000 cases of H1N1 
Swine Flu resulted in death.191  The severity of the H1N1 Swine Flu virus threat and the
corresponding media coverage surrounding it helped to cause a decline in ticket sales and 
attendance at Six Flags theme parks, particularly at the Company’s Texas and Mexico theme 
parks.192  In April 2009, the epidemic led to the closing of Six Flags Mexico for almost two
weeks by order of the Mexican government.193
ii. The Great Recession
Most economists agree that, though mid-2007 to 2009 was a far cry from a full scale 
Depression, it was the worst recession that the United States has experienced since the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s.194  In 2008 real GDP of the U.S. increased by a meager 0.4%, and it
decreased by 2.4% in 2009.195  The unemployment numbers were even bleaker.  In 2008,
190 Updated CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations and Deaths in the 
United States, April 2009 – April 10, 2010, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
(May 4, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_h1n1.htm.
191 Id.
192 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 42, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case 
No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 240).
193 Id.
194 Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNN MONEY, (May 25, 2009), http://
money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression_comparisons/.
195 Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2009 (Third Estimate) and Corporate Profits, 4th 
Quarter 2009, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, (March 26, 2010), https://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/national/gdp/2010/gdp4q09_3rd.htm.
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unemployment increased from 5.0% to 7.8% by the end of the year.196  In 2009, that number
increased to 10.0% by October.197  The rising unemployment and general deterioration of the
U.S. and international economies resulted in the decline of attendance, ticket sales, and consumer 
spending within the park.   
b. Exchange Offers
Debtors were unable to meet the approximately $318.8 million PIERS obligation due on 
August 15, 2009, so the Debtor sought to refinance or restructure the mandatory redemption 
date.198  This was particularly important because any default of the PIERS obligations would also
have resulted in a default of the Pre-Petition Credit Agreement and a potential acceleration of the 
obligations thereunder.199  Likewise, if the Lenders were to accelerate the obligations under the
Pre-Petition Credit Agreement, there could be a default under all of the Unsecured Notes.200
This would result in potentially all of the Debtor’s long-term debt becoming due and payable 
immediately.201  Therefore, Debtors proposed to exchange the Unsecured Notes for Debtor’s
common stock.202  The proposed exchange was conditioned on participation of at least 95% of
the aggregate principal amount of each issue of Unsecured Notes.203  The Debtors also
considered a similar agreement that would have converted the PIERS into shares of common 
stock, but when it became clear that 95% of the aggregate principal amount of each issue of 
196 Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (April 8, 2014), 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000. 
197 Id. 
198 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 42, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case 
No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 240).
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200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 42-43.
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Unsecured Notes would not participate in the exchange, the Debtors decided against any PIERS 
amendment.204  The Debtors believed that, due to the adverse market conditions previously
discussed, the offers of exchange and amendment would not have been adequate to resolve their 
financial issues.205
c. Negotiations with Avenue Capital Management
In an alternative attempt to resolve their financial issues, the Debtors entered into 
negotiations with Avenue Capital Management (“Avenue”), as they were the largest holders of 
2016 Notes, a significant holder of the other Unsecured Notes, and lender under the Pre-Petition 
Credit Agreement.206  The hope was that the negotiations could result in a pre-negotiated chapter
11 bankruptcy filing.207  The goals of the negotiation were to convert the 2016 Notes into the
majority of the equity of any reorganized entity and a reinstatement of the Prepetition Credit 
Agreement.208
During negotiations, the Debtors realized that, even with the proposed de-leveraging, an 
injection of an additional $200 million of capital would be required to ensure that the Debtor’s 
had sufficient liquidity for seasonal business.209  Even with an additional $200 million, the
Debtor’s would be exposed to a potential liquidity shortfall if the Partnership Park “puts” 
occurred at maximum permitted levels.210  In response to the request of the additional capital,
Avenue proposed debt funding of $175 million on a delayed-draw basis, with high interest and 
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205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy 36 
significant fees that were inconsistent with market terms.211  Avenue proposed two more
alternatives, each of which were not consistent with market terms and did not meet the $200 
million minimum capitalization, before the negotiations were abandoned.212
d. Prepetition Restructuring Agreement
In of 2009 the Debtors began negotiations with the other lenders under the Prepetition 
Credit Agreement (“Prepetition Lenders”) while they were negotiating with Avenue and with 
Avenue’s knowledge.213  By early June 2009, the Debtors and the other Prepetition Lenders had
agreed on basic restructuring terms that would convert the obligations under the Prepetition 
Credit Agreement into the majority of the equity of the reorganized Debtors.214  In addition,
under this agreement the Prepetition Lenders would permit the Debtors to obtain a new $150 
million revolving or multi-draw term credit facility to meet the Debtors liquidity needs for its 
seasonal business.215  The Debtors believed that this proposal was feasible and had a high
likelihood of being approved.  The Prepetition Lenders agreed to support the proposal so long as 
the (i) the financial restructuring would occur through a pre-negotiated chapter 11, (ii) the 
Debtors would adhere to the negotiated timeline for the restructuring, and (iii) the Debtors would 
adhere to the general terms that will be described infra.216
C. Filing the Petition
Finally, after months of negotiating with lenders in order to find alternative methods to 
resolve the Debtors’ financial issues, Premier International Holdings, Inc. (“Premier”) filed a 
211 Id. at 44. 
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voluntary petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 13, 2009 in the District of Delaware.217 
Premier retained the services of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., specifically Daniel J. 
Defranceschi, to file the petition.218  The Chief Financial Officer of Six Flags, Inc., Mr. Jeffrey 
R. Speed, signed the petition on behalf of the Debtor.219
Premier listed itself as a corporation with between 1 and 49 creditors, assets in an amount 
between $10,000,001 and $50 million, and liabilities in an amount between $1,000,001 and $10 
million.220  Premier further stated that its debts were business debts and that it estimated that 
funds were available for distribution to unsecured creditors.221   With the petition, Premier also 
filed a list of affiliates that had pending bankruptcy cases filed in the District of Delaware, a 
written consent from Premier’s Board of Directors, a list of Premier’s 20 largest creditors, and a 
list of equity holders.222
D. First Day Motions
On June 13, 2009, the date of the filing, the Debtors filed a series of “first day motions”.  These 
motions sought various forms of relief in order to minimize any disruption of the Debtors’ 
business operations and to facilitate the reorganization process.223  Listed below are some of the 
more notable first day motions filed. 
217 Id. 
218 DEBTORS’ VOLUNTARY PETITION, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al.,  Case 
09-12019, (Bankr. Del. 2009), (No. 1).
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222 Id.  The list of affiliates filing for bankruptcy would make up those debtors for purposes of 
joint administration.  Also, the list of equity holders only included Six Flags Theme Park, Inc.  
They own 100% of Premier International Holdings, Inc.’s stock. 
223  DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 46, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case 
No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 240).
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a. Case Administration
i. Motion for Joint Administration
There were 37 Debtors seeking joint administration.224  The Debtors’ stated reasons for
submitting a motion for joint administration were (i) to avoid duplicative notices, motions, and 
pleadings, thereby saving time and expense, (ii) significantly reducing the volume of pleadings, 
(iii) minimize unnecessary delays, and (iv) protect creditors of each individual Debtor from
potential conflicts of interest.225
b. Critical Obligations
ii. Motion to Pay Pre-Petition Wages, Benefits, Business Expenses, and
Related Items
At the time the Debtors filed their voluntary petition, they employed 1,636 full time 
employees and approximately 28,400 seasonal employees.226  The Debtors’ owed the employees
wages, salaries, overtime pay, commissions, incentive pay and bonuses, contractual 
compensation, severance, vacation pay, sick pay, holiday pay, and other accrued 
compensation.227  The Debtors estimate that unpaid employee compensation amounts to
approximately $3,827,945, unpaid employee business expenses to $3,360,000, unpaid employee 
benefits to $140,646, and other related obligations to employees to $1,834,023.228  Debtors
asserted that the obligations owed to employees were not so great as to deplete the assets for 
224 MOTION OF THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE 
JOINT ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR BANKRUPTCY CASES, In re Premier International Holdings, 
Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 3).
225 Id. 
226 MOTION TO PAY PREPETITION EMPLOYEE WAGES, BENEFITS, BUSINESS EXPENSES, AND 
RELATED ITEMS, at 8, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019 
(Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 13). 
227 Id. at 1. 
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distribution to unsecured creditors.229
iii. Motion to Pay Certain Pre-Petition Taxes
The Debtor’s requested to pay certain prepetition taxes, including all sales and use taxes, 
franchise and real estate taxes, and any other taxes for which the Debtors’ officers and directors 
may be personally liable.230  Most of the sales taxes were paid on a monthly basis, and those 
taxes were approximately $5.8 million per month during peak season.231  As of the petition date, 
Debtors owed approximately $670,000 in use taxes, $75,000 in franchise taxes, and $5.4 million 
in property taxes.232  The Debtors stated that their reasons for requesting to pay pre-petition debt 
were: 1) the prepetition taxes did not constitute a part of the Debtors’ estate, 2) almost all of the 
prepetition taxes would constitute a priority claim that would be paid in full under any plan of 
reorganization, 3) if certain of the prepetition taxes were not paid it would affect the Debtors’ 
ability to conduct business in certain jurisdictions, and 4) the Debtors’ officers might have faced 
personal liability if some of the prepetition taxes were not paid.233
iv. Motion to Pay Certain Critical Vendors
There were several providers of services and goods that were so critical that the Debtors 
asserted that they could not operate the parks or maintain their infrastructure without them.234 
Some of these vendors were claimed to be the only available source for a particular good or 
229 Id. 
230 MOTION OF DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO PAY CERTAIN 
PREPETITION TAXES, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No 09-12019 
(Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 9). 
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Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 5). 
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service required.235  Also, the Debtors made up the majority of the business of some of these
critical vendors, so they are reliant on each other.236  The Debtors asserted that the vendors
would stop providing their services if they did not pay their outstanding claims.237  If these
critical services were to stop, the Debtors asserted that their ability to operate during peak season 
would diminish, their reputation would be harmed, their ability to maintain customer loyalty 
would be undermined, and their restructuring efforts would be compromised.238
c. Business Operations
i. Motion to Prohibit Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or
Discontinuing Service
In this motion, the Debtors sought to prohibit utility companies currently providing service 
as well as those who would later provide service from altering, refusing, or discontinuing that 
service.239 Any such disruption would have hindered or prevented a successful reorganization
attempt.  In support of the motion, the Debtors asserted that the utility companies had adequate 
assurance of payment because the Debtors deposited a significant amount of cash with the utility 
companies or in an account set aside for the payment of the utility companies, and the Debtors 
established procedures to allow the utility companies to seek greater or different security for 
additional assurance of payment.240
ii. Motion to Maintain Certain Customer Programs
The Debtors used customer programs to obtain and develop a positive reputation of their 
235 Id.
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parks and merchandise and attract new customers.241  Such programs included Season Passes,
Group Ticket Sales, as well as other discounts and premiums.242  In 2008, 28% of park
attendance could be attributed to season passes, and 29% of park attendance could be attributed 
to group ticket sales.243  These figures showed the importance of the customer programs to the
continued operation of the parks. 
iii. Motion to Pay Insurance Policies in the Ordinary Course of Business and
Other Obligations in Respect Thereof
The Debtors filed this motion in order to continue all prepetition insurance policies in the 
ordinary course of business and to pay all obligations related to those insurance policies.244  The
Debtors asserted that the coverage provided by the insurance policies was necessary because it 
preserved value of the Debtors’ assets and was under the various laws and contracts that govern 
Debtors’ business operations.245  The Debtors’ obligations related to the insurance policies were
estimated to be approximately $3.3 million.246
d. Financial Operations
i. Motion to Maintain Existing Cash Management System and Bank
Accounts
The Debtors asserted that their corporate and park operations depended on the continued 
241 MOTION OF THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO (A) 
MAINTAIN CERTAIN CUSTOMER PROGRAMS AND (B) HONOR OR PAY RELATED PREPETITION 
OBLIGATIONS TO THEIR CUSTOMERS, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case 
No. 09-12019, (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 4).
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use of their existing cash management system.247  The centralized system allowed the Debtors to
control and monitor corporate funds, ensure cash availability, and reduce administrative 
expenses by facilitating the movement of funds.248  If not permitted to use the existing system,
the Debtors believed that payments to certain critical vendors, contractors, and employees would 
have been disrupted.249  The Debtors further stated in their motion that continued use of the cash
management system would help stabilize post-petition business operations and assist in 
reorganization efforts.250
According to guidelines set forth by the U.S. Trustee for the District of Delaware, a 
Chapter 11 debtor is required to close all existing bank accounts and open new debtor in 
possession bank accounts.251  The Debtors seek to have this requirement waived because it
would cause enormous delays and disruptions to the Debtors’ business and efforts to 
reorganize.252  The Debtors have over 100 bank accounts in North America alone that are part of
part of a carefully constructed cash management system, and just like any disruption to the cash 
management system would potentially disrupt payments critical to the operation of the Debtors’ 
business, any disruption to the bank accounts that make up the cash management system would 
potentially disrupt those payments.253
247 MOTION FOR ORDER UNDER 11 U.S.C. §§ 345, 363, 1107 AND 1108 AUTHORIZING (I) 
CONTINUED USE OF EXISTING (A) CASH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, (B) BANK ACCOUNTS, (C) 
BUSINESS FORMS, AND (D) DEPOSIT AND INVESTMENT GUIDELINES, (II) CONTINUATION OF 
INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONS WITH NON-DEBTOR AFFILIATES, AND (III) ACCORDING 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATUS TO ALL POSTPETITION INTERCOMPANY CLAIMS, In re Premier 
International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 6).  
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ii. Motion to Use Pre-Petition Cash Collateral
The Debtors requested the use of the lenders’ cash collateral, including that cash under the 
Credit Agreement, because there was an urgent need of cash to continue operating the business 
and to make all the necessary operating and restructuring expenses.254  Though the lenders had 
already agreed to the Debtors’ use of the cash collateral, it was still necessary to propose 
adequate protection for the lenders.255  The Debtors proposed to provide protection to the lenders 
in the form of super-priority administrative claims, liens on post-petition collateral, continued 
payment of interest and fees at the non-default rate with default interest to accrue on pre-petition 
obligations, reimbursement of certain fees and expenses, and adherence to a budget with regular 
reporting on the Debtors’ financial performance.256   
E. Creditors’ Committee
On June 26, 2009, the U.S. Trustee appointed 7 members to the Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors.257  These appointments include John J. Gorman, The Coca-Cola Company, Esopus 
Creek Value, The Bank of New York Mellon, Richard Schottenfeld, Whirley Industries, and 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A.258 The Creditors’ Committee had 3 advisors including Brown Rudnick 
LLP, Peter J. Solomon Company, and Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones.259 
254  MOTION OF THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR ENTRY OF ORDERS (I) 
AUTHORIZING THE USE OF LENDERS’ CASH COLLATERAL, (II) GRANTING ADEQUATE PROTECTION 
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09-12019, (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 22).
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F. The First Proposed Plan
a. Classification of Creditors and Equity Holders
According to the Bankruptcy Code, the creditors and equity holders must be divided into 
separate classes.  Each class should represent a group that has substantially similar interests and 
legal status as to the debtor.  In this case, the creditors and equity holders were divided up into 18 
classes.260  Of those classes, 5 would not be impaired by the proposed plan, and 13 would be 
impaired.261  Those classes that would have their legal, equitable, or contractual rights altered 
included Class 4 (SFTP Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims), Class 5 (SFTP TW Guaranty 
Claims), Class 6 (SFTP TW Indemnity Claims), Class 9 (SFO Prepetition Credit Agreement 
Claims), Class 10 (SFO TW Guaranty Claims), Class 11 (SFO TW Indemnity Claims), Class 12 
(SFI TW Guaranty Claims), Class 13 (SFI TW Indemnity Claims), Class 14 (SFI Unsecured 
Claims), Class 15 (Subordinated Securities Claims), Class 17 (Preconfirmation SFO Equity 
Interests), and Class 18 (Preconfirmation SFI Equity Interests).262  As stated in the Bankruptcy 
Code, these impaired classes had the right to vote on the confirmation of the chapter 11 plan and 
the right to receive no less than they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation of the Debtors.263   
b. Treatment of Claims Under the First Proposed Plan
i. Unclassified Claims
The claims that fall under this category include administrative expense claims, professional 
260 DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE, at 15, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019, (Bankr. Del. 
2009), (No. 239). 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 11 U.S.C. § 1126. 
Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy 45 
compensation and reimbursement claims, and priority tax claims.264  These claims are 
unimpaired, and as such they are deemed to have accepted the Chapter 11 Plan.265  
ii. Class 1: Other Priority Claims
The claims that fall under “Other Priority Claims” include certain wages, salaries, and 
other compensation obligations to the Debtors’ employees that fall under Section 507(a)(4), (5), 
(6), and (7) of the Bankruptcy Code.266  Under the plan, each holder of such a claim will receive 
cash in an amount equal to his or her claim.267 This class in considered unimpaired, and 
therefore, deemed to have accepted the terms of the Chapter 11 Plan268.  
iii. Class 2: Secured Tax Claims
Class 2 was among the unimpaired classes and those claims were deemed to have accepted 
the plan.  Included in Class 2 were any secured claims that, without its secured status, would be 
entitled to priority in right of payment under Sections 502(i) and 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.269  Under the Plan, all holders of a Class 2 claim will receive cash equal to the amount of 
the claim or semi-annual cash payments over a 5-year period in an amount equal to the claim.270   
iv. Class 3: Other Secured Claims
This class was another of the unimpaired classes.  It included all secured claims other the 
Secured Tax Claims, SFTP Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims, and SFO Prepetition Credit 
264 DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE, at 13-14, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019, (Bankr. 
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Agreement Claims.271  However, The Debtors believed that the amount of such claims would be 
$0, and so this class was not important.272 
v. Class 4: SFTP Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
This is the first of the unimpaired classes.  Those claims that fall into this class included 
any claims held against SFTP and SFTP subsidiaries by Prepetition Lenders under the 
Prepetition Credit Agreement.273  Under the Chapter 11 Plan, each of these claims will receive its 
ratable proportion of the New Term Loan and its ratable proportion of 92% of newly issued 
common stock.274  The stock will be subject to dilution by the Long Term Incentive Plan.275
vi. Class 5: SFTP TW Guaranty Claims
This class included any claims that arose under SFTP’s guaranty of obligations owed to 
Time Warner and its affiliates under the TW Loan.276  However, the claims had a maximum 
aggregate amount of $10 million.277  Under the plan, SFTP’s guaranty of the obligations would 
be discharged and Time Warner would receive a new guaranty of the obligations from the 
reorganized SFTP.278
vii. Class 6: SFTP TW Indemnity Claim
This class included any claims that arose under SFTP’s guaranty of obligations to Time 
Warner and its affiliates under the Subordinated Indemnity Agreement.279  Under the plan, those 
obligations will be discharged and a new guaranty of the obligations under the Subordinated 
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Indemnity Agreement shall be made by the reorganized SFTP.280
viii. Class 7: Subsidiary Unsecured Claims
Class 7 is another of the unimpaired classes and each holder of such claims is deemed to 
have accepted the plan.281  This class included any claim against the Debtors other than an 
Administrative Expense Claim, Priority Tax Claim, Other Priority Claim, Secured Tax Claim, 
Other Secured Claim, Prepetition Credit Agreement Claim, TW Guaranty Claim, TW Indemnity 
Claim, Subordinated Securities Claim, or Intercompany Claim.282  At the option of the 
reorganized Debtors, each Class 7 claim will be reinstated, and each holder of a Class 7 claim 
will be paid in full in cash on the distribution date or soon thereafter.283    
ix. Class 8: SFO Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
This class included all claims against SFO that arose under the Prepetition Credit 
Agreement.284  Under the Plan, any guaranty made by SFO of the obligations under the 
Prepetition Credit Agreement would be discharged and replaced by a new guaranty by the 
reorganized Debtors under the New Term Loan.285
x. Class 9: SFO TW Guaranty Claims
This class included any claims arising under SFO’s obligation to Time Warner and certain 
affiliates under the TW Loan, up to a maximum of $10,000,000.286  Under the Plan, SFO’s 
guaranty of the obligations under the TW Loan would be discharged in exchange for a new 
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guaranty of the obligations by the reorganized Debtors.287 
xi. Class 10: SFO TW Indemnity Claims
This class included any claims against SFO arising under the guaranty by SFO of 
obligations to Time Warner and certain affiliates under the Subordinated Indemnity 
Agreement.288  Under the Plan, SFO’s guaranty of the obligations under the Subordinated 
Indemnity Agreement would be discharged in exchange for a new guaranty by the reorganized 
Debtors.289
xii. Class 11: SFO Unsecured Claims
Included in this class were any unsecured claims against SFO, including the 2016 Notes.290  
Under the Plan, each holder of a Class 11 claim would receive a pro rata distribution of 7% of 
newly issued stock in the reorganized Debtors, subject to dilution by the Long-Term Incentive 
Plan.291
xiii. Class 12: SFI TW Guaranty Claims
Included in this class were any claims against the Debtors that arose under SFI’s guaranty 
of obligations owed to Time Warner and certain affiliates under the TW Loan up to $10 
million.292  Under the Plan, SFI’s guaranty of the obligations under the TW Loan would be 
discharged in exchange for a new guaranty of the obligations by the reorganized Debtors.293 
xiv. Class 13: SFI TW Indemnity Claims
Included in this class were any claims against the Debtors that arose under SFI’s guaranty 
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of obligations owed to Time Warner and certain affiliates under the Subordinated Indemnity 
Agreement.294  Under the Plan, the guaranty of obligations under the Subordinated Indemnity 
Agreement would be discharged and exchanged for a new guaranty by the reorganized 
Debtors.295
xv. Class 14: SFI Unsecured Claims
Included in this class were any unsecured claims against SFI, including 2010 Notes, 2013 
Notes, 2014 Notes, 2015 Notes, and SFI’s guaranty of the 2016 Notes.296  Under the Plan, any 
holder of Unsecured SFI Claims will receive a pro rata share of 1% of newly issued common 
stock of the reorganized Debtors.297
xvi. Class 15: Subordinated Securities Claims
These Claims included any claim against the Debtors (i) arising from the rescission of a 
purchase or sale of stock, debt, or any other securities of the Debtors or affiliates, (ii) for 
damages from the purchase or sale of any security, (iii) for violations of the securities laws, 
misrepresentations, or other similar claims, or (iv) for reimbursement, contribution, or 
indemnification allowed under the Bankruptcy Code on account of any such claims.298   This 
class is not important, however, as the Debtors estimated that such Class 15 claims would 
amount to $0.299 
xvii. Class 16: Preconfirmation Subsidiary Equity Interests
Class 16 was among the 5 unimpaired classes.  Included in this class were any instruments 
that evidenced an ownership interest in the Debtors, other than SFI or SFO, and all options, 
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warrants, or rights to acquire interests.300  Under the Plan, all such interest shall be reinstated.301
xviii. Class 17: Preconfirmation SFO Equity Interests
Class 17 included all instruments that evidenced an ownership interest in SFO, and all 
options, warrants, or rights to acquire such an interest.302  Under the Plan, all SFO equity 
interests would be cancelled, and any holder of a Class 17 interest would not be entitled to any 
property or interest on account of such cancellation.303  
xix. Class 18: Preconfirmation SFI Equity Interests
Class 18 included all instruments that evidenced an ownership interest in SFI, and all 
options, warrants, or rights to acquire such an interest.304  Under the Plan, all SFI equity interests 
would be cancelled, and any holder of a Class 18 interest would not be entitled to any property or 
interest on account of such cancellation.305 
G. Objections and Amendments to the Proposed Plan
a. Amendments to the Proposed Plan
The original proposed plan was first amended in August, though very little was changed 
except some additions regarding the Debtors’ financial condition and business projections.306  
The second amendment to the proposed plan increased amount of distribution of the SFO and 
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SFI unsecured note holders.307  The distribution to the SFO note holders was increased from a 
pro rata share of 7% of the newly issued common stock to a pro rata share of 69.77% share of 
newly issued common stock, and the distribution to the SFI note holders was increased from a 
pro rata share of 1% of the newly issued common stock to a pro rata share of 7.34% of the newly 
issued common stock.308  In addition to increasing the amount of distribution to the SFO and SFI 
note holders, the second amended plan also created a new class that included unsecured claims 
against a subsidiary called Funtime, Inc.309 The third and fourth amendments to the proposed 
plan only added technical amendments and additional disclosures.310 
b. Objection by the Committee of Unsecured Creditors
In March 2010 the Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed an objection to the fourth 
amended proposed plan.311  In the filed objection, the asserted reasons for the objection were an 
undervaluation of the Debtors, which resulted in in excess distributions to SFO note holders at 
the expense of SFI creditors.312  To resolve the problem, Debtors entered into negotiations with 
the Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which resulted in an Agreement in Principle.313  Under 
the Agreement in Principle, which was incorporated in the modified fourth amendment to the 
proposed plan, the SFO note holders would receive cash distributions equal to the share of their 
claims, and SFI note holders would receive a pro rata share of 9.5% of newly issued common 
307 DEBTORS’ SECOND AMENDED JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 22-23, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 
09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 944).
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stock.314 
c. Resilient Capital Management, LLC
In April, Resilient Capital Management, LLC filed a motion with the court to participate in 
the confirmation hearing regarding the Debtors’ plan of reorganization.315  Resilient, a large 
holder of PIERS, asserted that the Debtor were undervalued according to the plan of 
reorganization, and if properly valued they would have enough to make distributions to the 
holders of PIERS.316  Unfortunately for Resilient, the court rejected Resilient’s request and 
confirmation went ahead as planned.317 
H. Voting and Confirmation
Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 17, and 18 were unimpaired and, therefore, deemed to 
have accepted the plan for reorganization.318  Classes 15, 16, and 19 are impaired and deemed to 
have rejected.319  Classes 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 14 were impaired and voted to accept the plan.320  
The court filed its order confirming the Debtors’ plan of reorganization on April 30, 2010.321  
Under the plan, Six Flags was able to cut its obligations to $1 billion from $2.7 billion, and a 
314 DEBTORS’ MODIFIED FOURTH AMENDED JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 24-25, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., 
(Bankr. Del. 2010) (No. 1928). 
315 RESILIENT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC’S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
CONFIRMATION HEARING, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 
09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2010) (No. 1989).
316 RESILIENT PROMISES FIGHT ON AMENDED SIX FLAGS BANKRUPTCY PLAN, Daily Herald 
(April 16, 2010), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20100416/business/304169593/print/.  
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News (April 29, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-29/six-flags-neenah-visteon-
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group of investors would buy $725 million worth of newly issued common stock.322   The 
restructuring would be financed by a $1 billion of senior secured credit facilities, $120 million 
revolving credit facilities, and a $150 million loan from Time Warner.323  
V. POST BANKRUPTCY
A. After-affects
When the company emerged from bankruptcy, Snyder was out.324  In court documents 
filed with the SEC and before the bankruptcy was finalized, it was specified that Shapiro would 
retain a board seat with the ability to appoint the final director for the company “provided, 
however, that such remaining director shall not be Daniel M. Snyder.”325  Nonetheless, Shapiro 
and the rest of Snyder’s handpicked management team were gone shortly thereafter as well.326  
In a statement regarding Shapiro’s departure, Snyder stated “Shapiro bravely led Six Flags 
through an incredibly difficult period.  He has been an energetic, optimistic leader and problem 
solver…  Most of all I admire his tenacious dedication to protect the interests of the 28,000 Six 
Flags associates during this period of transition."327  Al Weber Jr., the former head of Paramount 
Parks became Six Flags’ president and interim CEO while the company searched for a 
322 Cotton Timberlake, Six Flags Exits Bankruptcy Protection After Cutting Debt By More Than 
Half, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 3, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-05-03/six-flags-exits-bankruptcy-protection-after-cutting-debt-by-more-than-
half.html.  
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JOURNAL (Feb. 4, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/02/04/dan-snyder-the-libel-lawsuit-
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permanent replacement.328  In August of 2010, James Reid-Anderson was named the new 
President and CEO of Six Flags, with Al Weber as the company’s new COO.329  Interestingly, 
Reid-Anderson had no experience in the theme park industry.330  Instead, he came from the 
engineering and electronics industry and was the former CEO of Siemens AG Healthcare 
Diagnostics Division.331  Commentators downplayed his lack of relevant experience and focused 
instead on information given in press releases, such as Reid-Anderson’s record of shareholder 
value creation.332  The hope was that alongside Al Weber’s industry experience, the duo would 
be able to build upon the momentum already underway at the parks.333   
Similar to Shapiro’s previously expressed hopes that the recession would prove to be a 
boost to the company’s revenues, investors were drawn to the company post-bankruptcy based 
on predictions that it would benefit from a slow recovery as parents would choose “stay-cations” 
over more expensive destinations.334  These predictions proved to be accurate and the company 
saw revenue gains and increased attendance in the years following the bankruptcy.  Six Flags had 
been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange before it filed for bankruptcy because of the 
328 Robert Niles, Mark Shapiro is Out at Six Flags; Former Paramount Parks Head Al Weber Is 
In, THEME PARK INSIDER (May 12, 2010), http://www.themeparkinsider.com/
flume/201005/1921/. 
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Officer of Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 13, 2010), http://
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company’s precarious debt situation and its failure to meet the NYSE’s listing criteria.335  On 
May 3, 2010, nearly a year after it was delisted, the company emerged from bankruptcy and 
simultaneously announced its intention to relist on the NYSE under its old ticker, SIX.336   
The company posted strong second quarter results in August 2010, and stated that the 
company saw a revenue increase of 7%, and an adjusted EBITDA increase of 68%.337  The 
company also highlighted its strong liquidity position, stating that it had a cash balance of $210 
million as of August 1, 2010.338  Increased attendance, sponsorship, top line growth, and 
effective cost management along with the new management team’s focus on theme park 
excellence and shareholder value creation were cited as reasons for the growth.339  The company 
reported similar strong performance during the following year, with revenue growth of 5%, and 
an adjusted EBITDA increase of 20%.340  The management team credited the identification of 
several large areas of revenue growth opportunities and the achievement of industry-leading 
margins such as improved ticket yields, cost management, and a more cohesive marketing plan 
as reasons for the strong results.341  The following two years the company reported similar gains, 
again citing solid attendance growth along with a substantial tax benefit for the strong 
335 Chris Hefty, Major Bankruptcy Success Stories, THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS D. HEFTY (Dec. 
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earnings.342  
Six Flags most recent stock price is down 0.35% to $39.77 a share.343  However, the price 
is up 6.47% year-over-year from $37.35 last year.344  In fact, the theme park operator’s current 
market standing could be characterized as surprising given former projections that the company 
would be looking at a loss of 20 cents per share during the fourth quarter of 2013.345  In 
February, the company actually reported a revenue increase year-over-year, delivering a 
substantial 15 cent per share profit.346  This is particularly significant because the company has 
historically experienced a loss during the fourth quarter due to the highly seasonal nature of the 
industry.347  Nevertheless, this development not only breaks a streak of two consecutive quarter 
losses, but also shows that the company may be well-positioned for the 2014 fiscal year.348   
Despite strong revenue numbers, there are still some naysayers.  Some commentators 
believe that the parks should have actually posted greater revenues due to the improving 
economic climate and that the revenue increase of 4% was a result of higher admission prices 
and in-park spending, and not the result of greater than average attendance.349  Critics often point 
to the Disney parks as the standard by which all theme parks should constantly be striving to 
342 Sandra Baker, Six Flags Reports Strong Fourth-Quarter Profits, STAR-TELEGRAM, at 1 (Feb. 
20, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/02/20/4633774/six-flags-reports-strong-
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mimic.  Although Six Flags can hardly be expected to spend the kind of money that Disney does 
in investing in new attractions, the small perks like the ability to reserve expedited ride lines, or 
larger perks designed to appeal to more affluent guests such as gourmet food offerings, are the 
sort of Disney-imitating changes that some believe would improve Six Flag’s bottom line.350  
Other commentators have praised the company’s changes since the bankruptcy in 2009, noting 
that the park now hosts outside advertisers and brands within the park, and have strategically cut 
out products that were not selling well and offering new, more appealing options.351 
The company’s current CEO, Jim Reid-Anderson, has noted that guest-satisfaction scores 
were at a record high last year, “our guests recognize we are providing innovative rides and 
attractions, superb service, and great value for their money.”352  Not all customers agree with 
Reid-Anderson’s estimation and believe the parks are still overpriced with regard to relative 
value.  Some customers continue to report feeling “gouged.”353  One reviewer stated that she felt 
like “Six Flags was trying to shake enough money out of me to singlehandedly keep them 
solvent.”354  She noted that since the company’s emergence from bankruptcy, “their financials 
give some telling insight into my expensive experience.”355  The commentator also discussed a 
recent Wall Street Journal article concerning the parks’ higher single-day ticket margins, stating 
350 Six Flags Entertainment, Whole Foods Market, TriQuint Semiconductor, RF Micro Devices 
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“Six Flags knows they don’t offer an attractive enough experience to get you to return 
throughout the season, so they have to zap your wallet the first time you go.”356  Regardless of 
criticism of the parks, Reid-Anderson is credited with achieving the noteworthy turnaround of 
the company, an occurrence directly attributable to his carefully carried out strategy to invest in 
every park.357  The investment has paid off not only in terms of attendance numbers, but has also 
served to significantly increase overall morale at the parks.358   
Despite the overwhelmingly good news regarding the park’s record-breaking quarter, the 
company has recently dealt with an unfortunate and tragic event at its park in Arlington where a 
woman fell to her death from a roller coaster named the Texas Giant in July of 2013.359  The 
family of the decedent, 52-year old Rosa Esparza, filed suit against Six Flags seeking a minimum 
of $1 million in damages for wrongful death due to alleged negligence.360  Six Flags filed a 
cross-claim against the German roller coaster manufacturer, maintaining that the manufacturer 
and not the park were at fault for the accident.361  Along with bad publicity, the park hosted 
significantly fewer guests at the Texas location due to the tragedy, and has estimated litigation 
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costs to be around $3 million.362  Nevertheless, the company reported that guest satisfaction 
scores which include safety ratings, were at record highs during the past year.363   
In Six Flag’s most recent quarterly earnings call on April 23, CEO Reid-Anderson 
specifically highlighted a 7% growth in guest spending per cap, which he credited to ticket 
pricing and in-park revenue strategies.364  In addition, he stated that the company’s Active Pass 
Base has grown 25%.365  He described the “Active Pass Base” as a new term representing the 
combined total active season pass holders and guests on the company’s membership plan, which 
reflect the company’s success in emphasizing membership plans.366  Furthermore, membership 
plans that renew automatically after one year create a recurring revenue and cash flow stream 
for 
the company.367  Reid-Anderson stated that these developments encourage an optimistic outlook 
for the 2014 season and beyond, “it all starts with delighting our guests ensuring they have fun 
at 
Six Flags, receive great value for their money and are eager to visit our parks again and 
again.”368  A recently published independent survey was also mentioned, recognizing Six Flags 
as a leader in guest satisfaction compared to all regional theme parks.369  Another high point was 
the company’s recent offering of an all-season dining pass that has turned out to be extremely
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successful with customers, resulting in considerable profits.370  During the 2014 season the park 
will also introduce several record-breaking rides, including a ride at Six Flags Great Adventure 
in New Jersey that has the distinction of being the tallest drop ride in the world, and a wooden 
roller coaster named Goliath at Six Flags Great America near Chicago that breaks several world 
records for speed, drop steepness, and drop depth.371   
In the call’s question and answer session, Reid-Anderson alluded to potential 
international expansion but was vague about the company’s specific plans for overseas locations.  
In response to direct questions about licensing opportunities outside North America he stated 
“the number [of theme parks] will increase…  there is a growing middle-class…  across the 
world and when you look at Asia, especially the Middle East, now there is more disposable 
income.”372  According to the company’s CFO, John Duffey, who fielded questions toward the 
end of the call, Six Flags is currently in discussions with real estate developers to gauge interest 
in plans to sell excess land.373  Responding to whether the sale of excess land could result in a 
sea change in leverage, Duffey stated that the company’s plans to monetize the land are 
contingent on the real estate market, and would likely not produce significant change in terms of 
the company’s leverage.374  In response to questions concerning whether the company had goals 
to return additional capital to shareholders from fee-related revenue, Duffy affirmed that they 
would consider returning additional capital to shareholders if they continue to see leverage 
decline with EBITDA growth, and that the company is “very happy with where our leverage is
370 Six Flags’ CEO Discusses Q1 2014 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA, at 2 
(Apr. 23, 2014), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2157993-six-flags-ceo-discusses-q1-2014-
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today.”375  In closing, Reid-Anderson encouraged the call participants to “visit our beautiful 
parks this season to experience all that we have to offer.  You can rest assured that our team is 
focused on delighting our guests and creating incremental shareholder value in the years 
ahead.”376 
375 Id. at 13.
376 Id. at 27. 
